LockBit Scenario: Municipality Payroll Crisis
Ransomware • LockBit
STAKES
Public service continuity + Employee payroll + Citizen data protection + Government operations
HOOK
Finance and HR teams at City of Millbrook report payroll systems locking up, city workstations displaying extortion notes, and failed access to employee banking files two days before payroll runs. Emergency and public works staff report intermittent outages while threat messages claim municipal records were copied and will be released.
PRESSURE
- Payroll deadline at Friday 5:00 PM for 800 employees
- Potential exposure of 38,000 resident records
- Extortion demand: $2.2 million
- Emergency spending cap: $100K
FRONT • 120 minutes • Advanced
Ransomware • LockBit
NPCs
- Patricia Hoffman (Mayor): Owns public communication and emergency governance decisions
- Kevin Chen (IT Director): Leads containment and service-restoration sequencing
- Sandra Williams (Payroll Director): Manages payroll execution risk and employee communications
- Mark Torres (City Manager): Coordinates cross-department continuity and escalation
SECRETS
- Security updates were deferred to avoid service downtime during budget cycle
- Backup validation for payroll and HR systems was incomplete
- Attackers accessed resident and personnel records before encryption
LockBit Scenario: Municipality Payroll Crisis
Ransomware • LockBit
STAKES
Public service continuity + Employee payroll + Citizen data protection + Government operations
HOOK
Finance and HR teams at Roskilde Kommune report payroll systems locking up, municipal workstations displaying extortion notes, and failed access to employee banking files two days before payroll runs. Social services, schools, and permitting desks report outages while threat messages claim municipal records were copied and will be released.
PRESSURE
- Payroll deadline at Friday 17:00 for 6,000 employees
- Potential exposure of 71,000 resident records
- Extortion demand: 16 million DKK
- Emergency spending cap: 750.000 DKK
FRONT • 120 minutes • Advanced
Ransomware • LockBit
NPCs
- Birgitte Nyborg (Borgmester/Mayor): Owns public communication and emergency governance decisions
- Troels Hartmann (IT-chef): Leads containment and service-restoration sequencing
- Katrine Fonsmark (Lonchef/Payroll Director): Manages payroll execution risk and employee communications
- Carl Morck (Kommunaldirektor/City Manager): Coordinates cross-department continuity and escalation
SECRETS
- Security updates were deferred to avoid service downtime during budget cycle
- Backup validation for payroll and HR systems was incomplete
- Attackers accessed resident and personnel records before encryption
Planning Resources
For detailed session preparation support, including game configuration templates, investigation timelines, response options matrix, and round-by-round facilitation guidance, see:
LockBit Municipality Payroll Crisis Planning Document
Planning documents provide 30-minute structured preparation for first-time IMs, or quick-reference support for experienced facilitators.
Ready-to-present RevealJS slides with player-safe mode, session tracking, and IM facilitation notes:
LockBit Municipality Scenario Slides
Press ‘P’ to toggle player-safe mode • Built-in session state tracking • Dark/light theme support
Scenario Details for IMs
Hook
“It is Thursday at 8:15 AM in City of Millbrook finance operations. Payroll staff preparing Friday disbursements for 800 employees lose access to banking export files and tax withholding systems. Within minutes, city workstations display extortion notes and service desks report outages across finance, permitting, and dispatch support systems. Leadership receives messages claiming municipal personnel and resident records were copied out of the network.”
“Initial disruption was logged at 8:15 AM, with payroll processing due by Friday 5:00 PM.”
“Operational scope: Municipality serving 45,000 residents with 800 employees, serving 45,000 residents.”
“(Regional context: US municipal operations.)”
“It is Thursday at 08:15 in Roskilde Kommune finance operations. Payroll staff preparing Friday disbursements for 6,000 employees lose access to banking export files and tax withholding systems. Within minutes, municipal workstations display extortion notes and service desks report outages across payroll, social services, and permitting systems. Leadership receives messages claiming personnel and resident records were copied out of the network.”
“Initial disruption was logged at 08:15, with payroll processing due by Friday 17:00.”
“Operational scope: Danish municipality serving 88,000 residents with 6,000 employees, serving 88,000 residents.”
“(Regional context: Denmark municipal operations.)”
Initial Symptoms to Present:
- “Payroll systems display extortion notes and block direct-deposit processing”
- “Municipal staff cannot access personnel records or tax-withholding exports”
- “Service desks report outages across permitting, dispatch support, and finance tools”
- “Threat messages claim employee and resident records were copied and will be released”
Key Discovery Paths:
Detective Investigation Leads:
- Timeline analysis shows attacker access prior to encryption and extortion messaging
- File-access logs indicate targeted collection of payroll and resident data repositories
- Evidence points to credential compromise and staged privilege escalation
Protector System Analysis:
- Payroll and HR systems are encrypted, blocking Friday payment workflow
- Recovery confidence is limited by incomplete backup validation
- Segmentation gaps allowed spread beyond finance into service-support systems
Tracker Network Investigation:
- Exfiltration telemetry indicates substantial transfer of personnel and resident files
- Beaconing patterns align with mature double-extortion operations
- Internal traffic maps show movement from administrative accounts to core municipal systems
Communicator Stakeholder Interviews:
- Employee groups need immediate clarity on payroll continuity and financial hardship support
- Residents request guidance on identity-risk exposure and protective actions
- Department leaders need a clear sequence for service restoration and public messaging
Mid-Scenario Pressure Points:
- Hour 1: Payroll batch generation fails, and department heads demand immediate alternatives
- Hour 2: Threat actors send sample employee records to prove exfiltration claims
- Hour 3: Emergency-service support workflows degrade as shared systems remain unavailable
- Hour 4: Media requests confirmation of resident-data exposure and incident scope
Evolution Triggers:
- If containment is delayed, additional municipal systems lose access and queue critical requests
- If recovery begins without validation, restored systems may reintroduce compromise
- If communication is delayed, employee trust and resident confidence decline quickly
Resolution Pathways:
Technical Success Indicators:
- Verified clean recovery path for payroll, HR, and service-support platforms
- Evidence package preserved for law-enforcement and regulator coordination
- Temporary service workflows established for critical municipal operations
Business Success Indicators:
- Payroll continuity plan executed with transparent employee communication
- Essential public services maintained with minimal interruption
- Leadership keeps public trust through timely and factual status updates
Learning Success Indicators:
- Team recognizes double-extortion leverage in municipal contexts
- Participants practice balancing public accountability with technical uncertainty
- Group coordinates operational, legal, and security decision-making under deadline pressure
Common IM Facilitation Challenges:
If Payroll Hardship Is Minimized:
“Which immediate action protects both payroll continuity and evidence integrity by end of day?”
If Public Accountability Is Deferred:
“How will you justify spending choices and response timing to employees, residents, and elected officials?”
If Regulatory Reporting Is Delayed:
“The state attorney general requests incident status and asks when affected employees and residents will be notified of potential personal-data exposure under state privacy law.”
“Datatilsynet requests incident status and asks when employees and residents will be notified of potential personal-data exposure under GDPR timelines.”
Success Metrics for Session:
Template Compatibility
This scenario adapts to multiple session formats with appropriate scope and timing:
Quick Demo (35-40 minutes)
Structure: 2 investigation rounds, 1 decision round
Focus: Core payroll-continuity and data-exposure discovery
Key Actions: Protect payroll processing, scope exfiltration, issue first public status decision
Lunch & Learn (75-90 minutes)
Structure: 4 investigation rounds, 2 decision rounds
Focus: Parallel containment, communication, and municipal-service prioritization
Key Actions: Build incident timeline, validate recovery path, sequence employee/resident notifications
Full Game (120-140 minutes)
Structure: 6 investigation rounds, 3 decision rounds
Focus: End-to-end municipal ransomware response under payroll deadline pressure
Key Actions: Coordinate city leadership with technical teams, make spending and disclosure calls, define durable remediation
Advanced Challenge (150-170 minutes)
Structure: 7-8 investigation rounds, 4 decision rounds
Expert Elements: Budget constraints, conflicting service priorities, and political oversight pressure
Additional Challenges: Ambiguous backup integrity, employee hardship escalation, and public records scrutiny
This Danish variation can be adapted to other EU countries during facilitation. EU countries share GDPR requirements (including 72-hour notification windows) but use different municipal and national institutions.
When adapting this scenario, substitute these elements:
| France |
CNIL |
Commune / Mairie |
ANSSI |
Prefecture coordination may shape crisis response |
| Germany |
BfDI + state DPAs |
Stadtverwaltung / Kommune |
BSI |
State-level authority often drives incident escalation |
| Netherlands |
Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens |
Gemeente |
NCSC-NL |
High digital-service dependence raises continuity stakes |
| Norway |
Datatilsynet |
Kommune |
NCSC-NO |
Not EU member, but GDPR-aligned practice applies |
| Sweden |
IMY |
Kommun |
CERT-SE |
Strong transparency expectations in public-sector incidents |
Notes:
- Federal systems: Germany and similar structures may require both national and state-level notifications.
- Service scope: Municipal responsibilities differ significantly by country and directly affect impact modeling.
- Public trust: Crisis communication expectations are often stricter in local government than in private-sector incidents.
Municipality names and NPC names can be localized by the IM to fit the table above.
Quick Demo Materials (35-40 min)
Guided Investigation Clues
- Clue 1 (Minute 5): Security operations at City of Millbrook confirms encryption across payroll and HR platforms with an extortion demand of $2.2 million.
- Clue 2 (Minute 10): Investigators confirm targeted reads of payroll and resident records before encryption.
- Clue 3 (Minute 15): Payroll Director Sandra Williams confirms employee direct-deposit routing files and withholding tables are inaccessible, placing Friday disbursement at immediate risk.
- Clue 1 (Minute 5): Security operations at Roskilde Kommune confirms encryption across payroll and HR platforms with an extortion demand of 16 million DKK.
- Clue 2 (Minute 10): Investigators confirm targeted reads of payroll and resident records before encryption.
- Clue 3 (Minute 15): Lonchef Katrine Fonsmark confirms employee direct-deposit routing files and withholding tables are inaccessible, placing Friday disbursement at immediate risk.
Pre-Defined Response Options
Option A: Service Continuity with No Payment
- Action: Isolate affected systems, execute emergency payroll fallback, restore from validated backups, and notify stakeholders promptly.
- Pros: Preserves accountability and reduces dependence on attacker promises.
- Cons: Short-term disruption may still delay selected municipal functions.
- Type Effectiveness: Super effective for long-term resilience and trust.
Option B: Payment-Centered Acceleration
- Action: Prioritize payment negotiation to seek rapid decryption while delaying broad disclosure.
- Pros: May reduce immediate technical outage if decryption works.
- Cons: No guarantee of deletion, high legal and trust risk, and weak strategic position.
- Type Effectiveness: Partially effective and operationally fragile.
Option C: Evidence-First Phased Recovery
- Action: Preserve forensic evidence, stage recovery, and sequence communications after initial scope confidence.
- Pros: Improves quality of reporting and downstream legal defensibility.
- Cons: Delay risk for payroll and resident communication commitments.
- Type Effectiveness: Moderately effective when execution discipline is high.
Lunch & Learn Materials (75-90 min, 2 rounds)
Round 1: Payroll Risk and Service Disruption (30-35 min)
Investigation Clues:
- Clue 1 (Minute 5): Encryption interrupts payroll workflow and service-support operations.
- Clue 2 (Minute 10): Forensics indicate exfiltration of personnel and resident files before encryption.
- Clue 3 (Minute 15): Payroll Director Sandra Williams confirms employee direct-deposit routing files and withholding tables are inaccessible, placing Friday disbursement at immediate risk.
- Clue 3 (Minute 15): Lonchef Katrine Fonsmark confirms employee direct-deposit routing files and withholding tables are inaccessible, placing Friday disbursement at immediate risk.
- Clue 4 (Minute 20): Threat messages include sample records to increase payment pressure.
Round 2: Reporting and Governance Decisions (30-35 min)
Investigation Clues:
- Clue 5 (Minute 30): Leadership receives escalating requests for public disclosure and employee guidance.
- Clue 6 (Minute 40): The state attorney general requests incident status and asks when affected employees and residents will be notified of potential personal-data exposure under state privacy law.
- Clue 6 (Minute 40): Datatilsynet requests incident status and asks when employees and residents will be notified of potential personal-data exposure under GDPR timelines.
- Clue 7 (Minute 50): Finance warns emergency procurement constraints may limit rapid recovery choices.
- Clue 8 (Minute 55): Department heads request priority order for service restoration.
Round Transition Narrative
After Round 1 -> Round 2:
“FBI and CISA report comparable municipal incidents where stolen payroll and resident records were used to pressure local governments into rushed payments.”
“CFCS reports comparable Danish municipal incidents where stolen payroll and resident records were used to pressure local authorities into rushed payments.”
Facilitation questions:
- “What is your minimum evidence threshold before confirming payroll continuity to staff?”
- “Which decision cannot wait for complete forensic certainty?”
- “How do you communicate uncertainty without losing employee and resident trust?”
Debrief Focus:
- Integrating payroll continuity with incident-command priorities
- Balancing legal defensibility with deadline pressure
- Preserving trust when service quality changes during containment
Full Game Materials (120-140 min, 3 rounds)
The Full Game expands from 2 guided rounds to 3 open-ended rounds. Players drive their own investigation using the Key Discovery Paths above rather than timed clues. Round 3 focuses on institutional recovery and municipal governance redesign.
Round 1: Executive Briefing and Scope Discovery (35-40 min)
Mayor Patricia Hoffman convenes an emergency meeting in city hall and states payroll cannot fail without immediate hardship for municipal staff. IT Director Kevin Chen confirms widespread encryption across finance and HR infrastructure. Payroll Director Sandra Williams reports direct-deposit batches cannot be generated for Friday processing. City Manager Mark Torres requests an immediate plan to protect essential services while preserving evidence for FBI and CISA coordination.
Borgmester Birgitte Nyborg convenes an emergency meeting and states payroll cannot fail without immediate hardship for municipal staff. IT-chef Troels Hartmann confirms widespread encryption across finance and HR infrastructure. Lonchef Katrine Fonsmark reports direct-deposit batches cannot be generated for Friday processing. Kommunaldirektor Carl Morck requests an immediate plan to protect essential services while preserving evidence for CFCS coordination and Datatilsynet reporting obligations.
Players investigate openly using role capabilities. Early findings include targeted exfiltration, payroll workflow encryption, and expanding service impact.
If team stalls: “You can prioritize speed or confidence first. Which path is defensible to employees and residents by end of day?”
Round 2: Regulatory Coordination and Deadline Decisions (35-40 min)
- Technical teams complete artifact collection and present recovery options with uncertainty bounds.
- Leadership requests a clear recommendation for payroll processing and disclosure sequence.
- Coordination now spans State privacy laws and public records obligations, State attorney general, and FBI and CISA channels.
- Coordination now spans GDPR and municipal public-administration obligations, Datatilsynet, and CFCS channels.
Facilitation questions:
- “What controls must be in place before releasing payroll and resident-facing systems?”
- “How will you document rationale so choices remain defensible in later review?”
Round 3: Institutional Recovery and Governance Redesign (40-45 min)
Opening: Two weeks later, immediate containment is complete and leadership requests a 90-day remediation roadmap with funding, ownership, and measurable outcomes.
Pressure events:
- Employee groups request guarantees on payroll reliability and data protection
- Residents demand evidence of concrete security improvement milestones
- Budget officials challenge proposed controls against competing service priorities
Victory conditions for full 3-round arc:
- Verified clean baseline for payroll and service-support platforms
- Defensible reporting package for regulators and public oversight
- Sustainable municipal security controls aligned to operational reality
Debrief Questions
- “Which early indicator most clearly signaled double-extortion leverage rather than a generic outage?”
- “How did payroll deadline pressure alter risk tolerance across leadership teams?”
- “What evidence was essential for credibility with employees, residents, and authorities?”
- “How can municipalities improve readiness before the next budget cycle forces tradeoff decisions?”
Debrief Focus
- Municipal ransomware incidents combine service continuity risk with public-accountability pressure
- Defensible response requires synchronized operational, legal, and technical decision-making
- Long-term resilience depends on tested recovery, segmentation, and transparent governance
Advanced Challenge Materials (150-170 min)
Red Herrings and Misdirection
- A routine finance-system patch window overlaps with attacker activity and confuses timeline analysis.
- A separate vendor outage appears related but is operationally independent.
- A social-media rumor about insider sabotage diverts attention from concrete forensic evidence.
Removed Resources and Constraints
- No prebuilt municipal ransomware playbook for payroll continuity
- Backup inventory documentation is incomplete and partially outdated
- Emergency procurement for tooling is constrained by spending thresholds
Enhanced Pressure
- Employee representatives demand same-day payroll confidence statements
- Residents request immediate details before full forensic scope is available
- Council oversight requires defensible written rationale for each major decision
Ethical Dilemmas
- Delay selected services for stronger evidence confidence, or restore faster with higher residual risk.
- Issue broad notifications early, or wait for cleaner scope and risk under-reporting.
- Preserve full forensic chain-of-custody, or accelerate operational recovery at attribution cost.
Advanced Debrief Topics
- Building municipal doctrine for ransomware plus data-extortion incidents
- Structuring governance when public expectations and technical certainty diverge
- Sustaining security investment when budgets compete with visible civic services