Litter Drifter Scenario: Ministry of Digital Infrastructure
Planning Resources
Scenario Details for IMs
Ministry of Digital Infrastructure: Ukrainian Government Under Nation-State Espionage
Organization Profile
- Type: Ukrainian government ministry responsible for national cybersecurity policy, digital infrastructure coordination, and critical infrastructure protection
- Size: 180 employees (45 policy analysts and strategic planners, 55 cybersecurity specialists and incident responders, 35 intelligence liaison officers, 25 international coordination staff, 20 administrative and support personnel)
- Operations: National cybersecurity policy development, critical infrastructure protection coordination, government network security oversight, international cybersecurity cooperation (NATO, EU), strategic technology policy, intelligence sharing with allied governments, cyber threat assessment and response coordination
- Critical Services: National cybersecurity strategy repository, NATO cyber defense coordination platform, critical infrastructure protection planning systems, diplomatic communication networks, government intelligence sharing portals, strategic policy documentation, international summit coordination infrastructure
Key Assets & Impact
What’s At Risk:
- NATO Summit Coordination & Diplomatic Planning: Friday NATO summit represents critical international security coordination during active Russian-Ukrainian conflict—Ministry coordinating Ukrainian cybersecurity defense briefings for 32 NATO member states, sharing intelligence on Russian cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure, developing collaborative defense strategies for protecting Ukrainian government networks during wartime. LitterDrifter USB worm systematically exfiltrating summit planning documents (classified diplomatic strategies, vulnerability assessments of Ukrainian critical infrastructure shared with NATO allies, coordinated response plans for Russian cyber attacks) provides adversary comprehensive intelligence on NATO-Ukraine cooperation enabling Russian forces to anticipate defensive measures, target specific vulnerabilities revealed in strategic planning, and disrupt international coordination supporting Ukrainian defense—diplomatic embarrassment where Ukraine cannot protect summit planning undermines NATO confidence in Ukrainian partnership during existential national security crisis
- Government Strategic Communications & Policy Intelligence: Three months of Ministry strategic policy development including national cybersecurity defense priorities revealing Ukrainian assessment of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, planned investments in cyber defense capabilities Ukrainian government intends to request from NATO partners, diplomatic negotiation positions for international cybersecurity cooperation agreements, internal government assessments of Russian cyber threat capabilities and targeting patterns. LitterDrifter collection of these policy documents provides Russian intelligence comprehensive understanding of Ukrainian defensive strategy: which critical infrastructure sectors Ukraine assesses as most vulnerable (power grid, telecommunications, financial systems), what cyber defense assistance Ukraine plans to request from allies (specific technologies, training programs, intelligence sharing agreements), where Ukrainian government believes Russian cyber operations will focus next—strategic intelligence enabling Russian forces to exploit known vulnerabilities before Ukrainian defenses can be strengthened while Ukrainian government unknowingly shares defense plans directly with adversary through ongoing espionage
- Counterintelligence Operations & Intelligence Liaison Integrity: Ministry serves as coordination point for Ukrainian intelligence services and allied governments (NATO intelligence sharing, EU cyber threat coordination, bilateral cooperation with US, UK, Poland on Russian cyber operations)—Colonel Shevchenko’s intelligence liaison office manages classified threat intelligence exchanges revealing Russian military cyber capabilities, coordinates with Western intelligence agencies on attribution and response, shares Ukrainian government knowledge of Russian hacking infrastructure and tactics. LitterDrifter compromise of intelligence liaison systems means three months of classified intelligence sharing with allied governments potentially exposed to Russian intelligence: which Russian cyber operations NATO has detected and attributed, what intelligence sources and methods allies use to track Russian hacking groups, Ukrainian government’s own intelligence collection on Russian cyber units—compromise threatens to expose intelligence sources enabling Russian countermeasures, undermines allied trust in Ukrainian ability to protect classified intelligence during wartime cooperation, potentially reveals Ukrainian government penetration of Russian systems that Russian intelligence would immediately move to shut down
Critical Timeline:
- Current moment (Monday 9am): IT staff discovers LitterDrifter USB worm targeting Ukrainian-language government systems, forensic analysis shows three months undetected propagation systematically collecting strategic policy documents and diplomatic communications, nation-state malware specifically designed for Ukrainian government targeting during active conflict
- Immediate pressure (Tuesday afternoon NATO pre-brief): Ukrainian delegation providing preliminary briefing to NATO cyber defense working group ahead of Friday summit, must assure allies Ukrainian government maintains operational security for classified summit planning while knowing LitterDrifter espionage may have already compromised NATO-shared intelligence creating diplomatic credibility crisis where Ukrainian assurances conflict with forensic evidence
- Wednesday intelligence liaison crisis: Allied intelligence agencies (US Cyber Command, UK GCHQ, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) require damage assessment determining scope of classified intelligence exposure through Ukrainian government compromise—incomplete assessment risks ongoing Russian access to allied intelligence sharing, comprehensive analysis requires suspending intelligence exchanges halting critical wartime cooperation supporting Ukrainian defense operations
- Friday NATO summit: 32 NATO member states convening for cybersecurity cooperation coordination during Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Ukrainian Ministry presenting national cyber defense needs and requesting allied assistance, summit success depends on demonstrating Ukrainian government operational security competence while LitterDrifter investigation reveals three-month undetected nation-state espionage specifically targeting summit coordination and diplomatic planning affecting NATO confidence in Ukrainian partnership
Key Assets & Impact
Three Impossible Decisions:
NATO Summit Participation vs Espionage Disclosure: Ministry can proceed with Friday NATO summit presentation maintaining scheduled cybersecurity cooperation (preserves Ukrainian diplomatic relationships, enables critical defense assistance requests, demonstrates operational continuity during wartime) BUT forensic evidence shows LitterDrifter exfiltrated summit planning documents meaning Russian intelligence already knows Ukrainian negotiation positions and vulnerability assessments potentially compromising summit effectiveness and Ukrainian strategic advantage, OR disclose three-month espionage campaign to NATO allies before summit requiring postponement pending damage assessment (demonstrates Ukrainian transparency and security responsibility) BUT postponement signals Ukrainian government cannot protect classified NATO coordination during active conflict undermining allied confidence in Ukrainian partnership when defense cooperation is existential national security requirement.
Intelligence Sharing Continuity vs Counterintelligence Protection: Ministry can maintain ongoing intelligence exchanges with allied governments during investigation (preserves critical wartime intelligence cooperation supporting Ukrainian defense, demonstrates operational resilience, maintains allied partnerships) BUT LitterDrifter compromise of intelligence liaison systems means continued sharing risks exposing additional classified allied intelligence to Russian collection creating liability for Ukrainian government inability to protect partner nation secrets, OR suspend intelligence exchanges until comprehensive damage assessment confirms no ongoing Russian access (protects allied classified information, demonstrates counterintelligence responsibility) BUT intelligence suspension halts critical threat information flow supporting Ukrainian cyber defense during active Russian military operations where real-time intelligence on Russian cyber targeting literally protects critical infrastructure and government operations from ongoing attacks.
Diplomatic Transparency vs National Security Credibility: Ministry can provide NATO allies comprehensive disclosure of three-month undetected espionage including full scope of compromised diplomatic planning and strategic policy theft (meets transparency obligations, enables allied counterintelligence response, demonstrates Ukrainian accountability) BUT comprehensive disclosure reveals Ukrainian government failed to detect nation-state targeting for three months during active conflict undermining NATO confidence in Ukrainian operational security competence when summit partnership discussions depend on allied trust in Ukrainian ability to protect classified cooperation, OR limit disclosure to confirmed compromises minimizing diplomatic damage (preserves Ukrainian credibility for summit participation, maintains allied confidence in partnership) BUT incomplete disclosure risks allies discovering additional compromises through their own intelligence creating credibility destruction where Ukrainian government appears to hide espionage scope from partners whose defense cooperation Ukraine desperately needs during existential wartime crisis.
Immediate Business Pressure
Monday morning, three months into what Ministry of Digital Infrastructure later discovers was sophisticated Russian nation-state espionage campaign specifically targeting Ukrainian government operations during active military conflict. Cybersecurity Director Major Alexei Kozlov reviewing routine USB security monitoring when malware analyst flags concerning pattern: removable media propagation targeting Ukrainian-language systems with characteristics matching nation-state techniques, strategic government document access patterns suggesting intelligence collection rather than disruptive attack, sophisticated persistence mechanisms indicating long-term espionage rather than opportunistic malware. Alexei’s initial assessment considers possibility of advanced persistent threat but hopes for less catastrophic explanation—perhaps security research tools accidentally deployed, or commodity malware coincidentally targeting government.
Within hours, forensic investigation confirms devastating reality: LitterDrifter USB worm specifically engineered for Ukrainian government targeting, three months of undetected propagation across Ministry networks systematically exfiltrating strategic policy documents and diplomatic communications, malware design demonstrating intimate knowledge of Ukrainian government operations suggesting Russian intelligence service development. The espionage scope is comprehensive and strategic: NATO summit coordination documents revealing Ukrainian defense priorities and allied cooperation plans, critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments shared with NATO partners for defensive planning, diplomatic negotiation positions for international cybersecurity agreements, classified intelligence exchanges with allied governments on Russian cyber operations. Forensic timeline shows infection initiated precisely when Ministry began intensive NATO summit preparation—targeting timing suggests Russian intelligence anticipated increased strategic communications value during summit planning.
Alexei’s emergency briefing to Minister Dr. Olena Petrov delivers impossible news during critical diplomatic timeline: “We have confirmed Russian nation-state USB worm targeting Ukrainian government operations for three months. The malware has systematically collected NATO summit planning documents, strategic policy communications, and classified intelligence liaison materials. Discovery comes four days before NATO summit where we’re presenting Ukrainian cyber defense needs to 32 member states. Russian intelligence already knows our summit strategy, our vulnerability assessments, and our intelligence sharing with allies. We cannot assure NATO operational security while forensics show three-month compromise of summit coordination.”
Olena’s response reflects government crisis during active conflict: “Friday summit is existential for Ukrainian defense. We need NATO cybersecurity assistance—resources, intelligence, technology—to defend critical infrastructure against ongoing Russian cyber operations targeting our power grid, telecommunications, government networks. If we disclose three-month espionage to NATO before summit, allies will question whether Ukraine can responsibly handle classified cooperation. If we proceed without disclosure and allies discover compromise through their own intelligence, we destroy trust permanently. And if we postpone summit for investigation, we signal Ukrainian government cannot maintain operational security during wartime when NATO partnership is literally our national survival strategy.”
Intelligence Liaison Colonel Viktor Shevchenko provides catastrophic damage assessment for allied relationships: “The Ministry coordinates classified intelligence sharing with US Cyber Command, UK GCHQ, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, EU cyber threat intelligence network. LitterDrifter accessed intelligence liaison systems containing three months of exchanges on Russian cyber operations: attributed attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure, Russian hacking group infrastructure and tactics, allied intelligence collection methods and sources. If this intelligence reached Russian SVR or GRU, they know which operations NATO has detected, what sources revealed them, how allied intelligence tracks Russian cyber units. We have mandatory disclosure obligations to every allied government whose classified intelligence may have been compromised through Ukrainian systems. Those disclosures will require damage assessments from each partner nation determining whether continued intelligence sharing with Ukraine is acceptable risk during active conflict.”
Senior Policy Analyst Maria Doroshenko discovers strategic policy theft implications through document analysis: “LitterDrifter specifically targeted our NATO summit planning repository. Russian intelligence has our complete summit strategy: exactly what cyber defense assistance we’re requesting from NATO (specific technologies worth €45M, training programs for 200 Ukrainian cyber defenders, real-time intelligence sharing on Russian targeting), our internal vulnerability assessments revealing which Ukrainian critical infrastructure sectors we assess as most vulnerable to Russian attack (power generation facilities in eastern Ukraine near conflict zones, telecommunications infrastructure supporting military operations, financial systems enabling wartime economy), our diplomatic negotiation positions for international cooperation agreements. They know where we’re weakest, what we’re planning to request, how we’re positioning Ukrainian cyber defense needs. Russian military can exploit vulnerabilities we identified before NATO assistance arrives, and Russian diplomats can undermine Ukrainian requests by revealing our internal assessments to weaken allied support.”
Tuesday afternoon pre-briefing for NATO cyber defense working group creates immediate diplomatic pressure. Ukrainian delegation (Olena, Alexei, senior advisors) providing preliminary summit overview to allied representatives—demonstrating Ukrainian cyber defense progress, previewing assistance requests, coordinating summit logistics. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence representative raises operational security question: “Your Ministry will be discussing classified critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and requesting sensitive cyber defense assistance. Can you assure member states that Ukrainian government maintains adequate operational security for protecting NATO-shared intelligence during this cooperation?” Standard diplomatic question, routine assurance expected. Olena knows forensic evidence shows three-month Russian espionage specifically targeting NATO coordination, making “adequate operational security” assurance factually incorrect. Providing false assurance to allies creates liability when truth emerges, disclosing compromise now derails summit preparation and undermines Ukrainian credibility for defense cooperation.
Wednesday intelligence liaison crisis explodes when allied agencies discover LitterDrifter investigation through routine coordination. US Cyber Command liaison officer calls Colonel Shevchenko directly: “We’re receiving reports through intelligence channels that Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Infrastructure is investigating Russian nation-state malware targeting government systems. Our classified intelligence sharing agreements require immediate notification if compromise affects US intelligence provided to Ukrainian government. We’ve been sharing real-time threat intelligence on Russian cyber operations for three months through your liaison office. Was our intelligence potentially exposed?” Viktor faces impossible decision: confirm three-month compromise requiring US damage assessment that will likely suspend intelligence sharing during active Russian cyber operations targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, or claim investigation is precautionary knowing US intelligence services will discover truth through independent means destroying Ukrainian credibility for future cooperation when intelligence sharing literally supports Ukrainian defense operations.
Allied intelligence agencies begin coordinated damage assessment requests: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, UK GCHQ, Polish cyber command, EU cyber threat intelligence network—each organization shared classified intelligence through Ministry liaison systems over three-month LitterDrifter compromise period, each organization now requires comprehensive disclosure determining exposure scope before continued cooperation, each organization weighing whether Ukrainian government operational security failures during active conflict represent unacceptable risk for future classified sharing. The cumulative effect is paralysis of intelligence cooperation supporting Ukrainian cyber defense precisely when Russian military cyber operations are escalating: daily attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure, telecommunications disruption targeting military communications, government network intrusions attempting to steal operational planning. Ukrainian defenders need real-time allied intelligence on Russian targeting to protect critical systems, but allied governments cannot share intelligence until Ukrainian government assures no ongoing compromise—assurance requires comprehensive investigation that cannot complete before intelligence sharing suspension cripples Ukrainian defensive capabilities.
Friday NATO summit looms as binary outcome: proceed with scheduled Ukrainian presentation demonstrating cyber defense competence while concealing three-month espionage investigation (maintains summit timeline, enables defense assistance requests, preserves Ukrainian credibility for cooperation BUT creates massive liability when allies inevitably discover compromise through counterintelligence creating permanent trust destruction), OR disclose Russian espionage requiring summit postponement pending damage assessment (demonstrates Ukrainian transparency and accountability BUT signals Ukrainian government cannot protect NATO classified cooperation during active conflict undermining allied confidence in partnership when cyber defense assistance is critical national security requirement supporting Ukrainian resistance to Russian military operations). The Ministry’s fundamental value proposition to NATO partners is “Ukraine can responsibly handle classified cyber defense cooperation”—three-month undetected Russian espionage during summit preparation directly contradicts this proposition regardless of subsequent investigation quality or transparency.
Cultural & Organizational Factors
Why This Vulnerability Exists:
Wartime operational tempo prioritizes mission execution over security hygiene: Ministry organizational culture reflects Ukrainian government reality during active military conflict with Russia: “defend critical infrastructure and maintain international partnerships above all security friction”—Olena’s strategic planning sessions emphasize “maintaining NATO cooperation and allied intelligence sharing” as existential national security requirements where any delays or complications in international coordination literally affect Ukrainian ability to resist Russian military operations. Ministry success metrics during conflict measure “allied defense assistance secured” and “intelligence sharing volume with partners” as primary performance indicators directly affecting Ukrainian critical infrastructure protection. Alexei’s cybersecurity team learned operational security measures requiring staff time or system downtime get deferred during intensive diplomatic coordination because summit preparation and intelligence liaison operations cannot tolerate disruptions when timeline slippages affect national defense. USB security policies requiring device scanning before use were documented but not consistently enforced because policy analysts working on urgent NATO coordination materials under tight deadlines bypassed security procedures to maintain productivity. Network segmentation proposals separating diplomatic communications from general government operations repeatedly postponed because inter-ministry information sharing during wartime requires rapid cross-functional access to strategic planning documents. Viktor’s intelligence liaison protocols theoretically required air-gapped systems for classified allied exchanges but practical reality of coordinating real-time threat intelligence on Russian cyber operations necessitated network connectivity enabling rapid information flow supporting Ukrainian defenders. Result: USB worm exploited precisely the security procedure deferrals that wartime operational tempo created—policy analysts bypassed device scanning to maintain summit preparation deadlines, network connectivity enabled lateral movement across systems that should have been segmented, and three-month undetected espionage occurred during period when Ministry was most focused on diplomatic coordination rather than internal security vigilance because Ukrainian government correctly assessed that missing NATO summit was greater existential threat than theoretical nation-state targeting during active conflict with sophisticated Russian adversary already conducting comprehensive cyber operations against all Ukrainian government ministries simultaneously.
International cooperation culture assumes allied operations security without verifying Ukrainian protection: Ministry operates within NATO-Ukraine partnership framework where organizational priorities focus on “demonstrating Ukrainian competence for allied defense cooperation and intelligence sharing”—Olena’s diplomatic strategy positions Ministry as “reliable NATO cybersecurity partner” capable of protecting classified cooperation, policy briefings to allied governments emphasize Ukrainian cyber defense progress and operational security improvements, intelligence liaison office markets Ukrainian government value as intelligence source on Russian cyber operations. Viktor’s liaison team processes classified intelligence from US Cyber Command, UK GCHQ, NATO centers of excellence under assumption that receiving classified intelligence from sophisticated allied security services validates Ukrainian operational security because “allies wouldn’t share if they didn’t trust our protection capabilities.” Ministry staff interpreted allied intelligence sharing as implicit certification of Ukrainian security competence creating cultural assumption that “if NATO shares classified intelligence with us, our security must be adequate” rather than recognizing allied governments accept calculated risk balancing intelligence value against protection concerns during Ukrainian wartime crisis requiring support. Alexei’s security program prioritized protecting outbound intelligence (Ukrainian government assessments shared with allies) over securing inbound intelligence systems (allied classified information received through liaison) because organizational culture measured success through “intelligence we provide to partners demonstrating Ukrainian value” rather than “intelligence protection responsibility we owe to allies.” Maria’s policy team focused effort on developing strategic recommendations for NATO consumption rather than operational security for strategic document repositories because career advancement and ministry mission success derived from “impressing allied governments with Ukrainian analysis quality” not “implementing comprehensive information protection.” Result: Three months of Russian espionage occurred in precisely the systems handling most sensitive allied classified intelligence because Ministry organizational culture prioritized demonstrating value to NATO partners over protecting NATO-shared intelligence, USB worm targeted Ukrainian government during period of maximum allied intelligence sharing when Ministry was receiving elevated classified threat information supporting summit coordination, and cultural assumption that “allied intelligence sharing validates our security” prevented recognition that sophisticated allied security services accept Ukrainian government protection risks during wartime crisis as necessary cost of supporting Ukrainian resistance to Russian military operations rather than as validation of Ukrainian operational security adequacy.
Nation-state threat perception focuses on disruptive attacks rather than espionage reconnaissance: Ministry cybersecurity program reflects Ukrainian government experience with Russian cyber operations emphasizing “destructive attacks on critical infrastructure and government operations”—Alexei’s threat model prioritizes defending against NotPetya-style wiper malware targeting power grids, BlackEnergy attacks on electrical distribution, Russian military cyber operations attempting to disrupt Ukrainian government communications and command systems during active conflict. Ukrainian cyber defense investments focus on resilience and recovery capabilities: backup systems for restoring critical infrastructure after Russian destructive attacks, incident response plans for managing large-scale government network compromises, international coordination for rapid allied assistance when Russian cyber operations target Ukrainian essential services. Ministry security awareness training emphasizes “Russian cyber attacks will attempt to destroy Ukrainian systems to support military operations” teaching staff to watch for signs of destructive malware, network outages, data deletion—concrete dramatic incidents that validate “cyber attack” mental model. However, threat model focusing on destructive operations created blind spot for subtle espionage reconnaissance: USB worm conducting quiet intelligence collection without disrupting operations didn’t trigger security alerts because it contradicted staff expectation that “Russian cyber attacks are loud and destructive,” LitterDrifter careful data exfiltration avoiding network performance degradation meant monitoring systems optimized for detecting massive data destruction missed gradual strategic intelligence theft, staff reporting culture encouraged escalating “systems down” incidents matching destructive attack profile but not “slightly unusual USB behavior” observations that might indicate espionage because organizational reward structure recognized and valued identification of destructive threats supporting operational resilience mission. Viktor’s intelligence liaison office similarly focused counterintelligence vigilance on preventing Russian penetration that would enable destructive attacks on NATO coordination rather than recognizing ongoing Russian espionage as equally dangerous threat even without immediate operational disruption. Result: Three-month LitterDrifter campaign remained undetected because Ukrainian government threat perception shaped by years of Russian destructive cyber operations created organizational expectation that “real nation-state threats destroy systems” rather than recognizing espionage intelligence collection as equally strategic threat to Ukrainian national security, malware designed to avoid operational disruption while conducting reconnaissance evaded detection systems and security awareness specifically optimized for identifying destructive attacks, and Ministry discovered that nation-state adversaries pursuing strategic intelligence objectives through subtle espionage reconnaissance can be more dangerous than dramatic destructive attacks because espionage enables adversary to understand Ukrainian defensive capabilities, diplomatic strategies, and allied cooperation plans allowing Russian intelligence to optimize future military cyber operations while Ukrainian government remains unaware of intelligence compromise until diplomatic damage is irreversible.
USB security policies assume individual user responsibility rather than systemic technical controls: Ministry information security framework reflects government administrative approach: “comprehensive policy documentation with user compliance expectations”—Alexei’s cybersecurity office maintains detailed USB device security procedures documented in ministry information security manual (22 pages of policy requirements), annual security awareness training teaches staff about USB malware risks and procedures for device scanning before use, quarterly security briefings remind employees about removable media policies, individual manager responsibility for ensuring subordinate staff compliance with security procedures. However, policy-focused approach relied on user behavior modification rather than technical enforcement: USB ports remained enabled on government workstations because disabling ports would prevent legitimate work requiring external storage for transporting large diplomatic documents between classified and unclassified systems, device scanning procedures required voluntary user initiation because automated scanning would delay file access interrupting urgent policy work, security monitoring detected suspicious USB activity only after infection occurred because preventive technical controls would require infrastructure investment and operational disruption during wartime resource constraints. Ministry administrative culture measured security program success through “policy compliance percentages” derived from annual security training completion rates and quarterly attestations rather than “actual security outcomes” measured by prevented compromises or detected espionage. Olena’s executive leadership evaluated Alexei’s cybersecurity performance based on “ministry passing government security audits” verifying policy documentation exists rather than “effectiveness preventing nation-state targeting” measured through adversary detection capabilities. Maria’s policy analysts correctly understood USB security procedures but rational individual decision-making during urgent summit preparation led to systematic policy violations: scanning USB devices added 3-5 minute delays when policy analysts needed immediate access to draft documents for minister review before diplomatic meetings, compliance with security procedures risked missing tight coordination deadlines affecting Ukrainian position in NATO negotiations, individual career success depended on delivering timely policy analysis supporting summit preparation not on perfect security compliance with USB scanning procedures that seemed like theoretical bureaucratic requirements compared to concrete diplomatic deadlines affecting Ukraine’s war effort. Result: LitterDrifter exploited systematic gap between documented USB security policies and actual operational practices where user behavior modification approach failed against sophisticated nation-state adversary engineering social targeting of time-pressured government employees during wartime crisis, policy analysts made individually rational decisions prioritizing diplomatic mission success over security compliance when procedures conflicted with urgent operational requirements, and Ministry discovered that administrative security frameworks depending on individual user compliance cannot protect against nation-state adversaries specifically studying organizational culture and operational tempo to design espionage campaigns exploiting predictable human behavior under pressure where security procedures systematically lose to mission urgency in individual decision-making during crisis.
Operational Context
How This Ukrainian Government Ministry Actually Works:
Ministry of Digital Infrastructure operates as Ukrainian government coordination center for national cybersecurity policy during active military conflict with Russian Federation. The Ministry’s mission during wartime is existential: protect Ukrainian critical infrastructure (power generation, telecommunications, financial systems, government networks) from ongoing Russian military cyber operations, coordinate international cybersecurity cooperation with NATO and EU allies providing defensive assistance, develop national cyber defense strategy supporting Ukrainian resistance to Russian invasion, manage intelligence sharing with allied governments on Russian cyber threat capabilities. Ministry success during conflict literally affects Ukrainian national survival—effective critical infrastructure protection maintains essential services supporting population and military operations, robust NATO cybersecurity partnership secures allied defense assistance and intelligence sharing, strong international coordination enables Ukrainian government to leverage Western cyber capabilities against Russian military targeting.
The Friday NATO summit represents critical diplomatic opportunity for Ukrainian cyber defense. 32 NATO member states convening for cybersecurity cooperation coordination during Russian-Ukrainian conflict—Ukrainian Ministry presenting national defense needs, requesting specific allied assistance (€45M in cyber defense technology, training programs for 200 Ukrainian defenders, real-time intelligence sharing on Russian targeting), demonstrating Ukrainian government operational security competence to justify classified cooperation. Summit success enables material support for Ukrainian critical infrastructure protection: allied cyber defense tools for protecting power grids from Russian attacks, intelligence on Russian military cyber operations enabling preemptive defense, technical expertise from NATO members for hardening Ukrainian government networks. Summit failure or postponement delays critical defensive assistance while Russian cyber operations continue daily attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure—actual operational impact measured in power outages affecting civilian population, telecommunications disruptions degrading military communications, government system compromises stealing operational planning supporting Russian military targeting.
International intelligence cooperation through Ministry liaison office provides Ukrainian defenders with strategic threat intelligence on Russian cyber operations. US Cyber Command shares real-time intelligence on Russian military cyber unit activities enabling Ukrainian defenders to anticipate and prevent attacks on critical infrastructure before they succeed, UK GCHQ provides technical analysis of Russian malware capabilities helping Ukrainian incident responders develop defensive countermeasures, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence coordinates allied cyber threat intelligence giving Ukrainian government comprehensive picture of Russian offensive capabilities. This intelligence sharing is not theoretical partnership—it provides actionable defensive intelligence literally protecting Ukrainian critical systems from Russian military targeting daily. Example: US Cyber Command detection of Russian military cyber unit preparing destructive attack on Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure enabled Ukrainian defenders to implement emergency protective measures preventing communications disruption that would have degraded military coordination during active combat operations. Intelligence sharing suspension during LitterDrifter investigation means loss of this real-time threat intelligence precisely when Russian cyber operations are escalating.
The Ministry’s organizational culture during wartime reflects Ukrainian government operational reality: every diplomatic engagement, every policy decision, every strategic communication potentially affects Ukrainian ability to resist Russian military operations. Olena’s strategic planning sessions occur under constant awareness that Ukrainian critical infrastructure protection depends on maintaining NATO confidence in Ukrainian partnership—any diplomatic failure, any security lapse, any operational incompetence undermines allied willingness to provide cyber defense assistance when Ukrainian government desperately needs technology, intelligence, and expertise to defend against sophisticated Russian military cyber capabilities. Policy analysts working on NATO summit materials understand their document quality and analytical rigor directly affects whether allied governments approve Ukrainian requests for defensive assistance—individual analyst work product literally impacts Ukrainian power grid protection and telecommunications security through its influence on NATO resource allocation decisions.
The Monday morning LitterDrifter discovery creates cascading crisis across every Ministry mission dimension simultaneously. NATO summit participation (existential for securing allied cyber defense assistance) becomes impossible without disclosing three-month espionage to allies who will question Ukrainian operational security competence. Intelligence sharing with allied governments (critical for defending Ukrainian infrastructure from Russian daily attacks) faces suspension pending damage assessment determining whether Ukrainian systems are secure enough for continued classified cooperation. International diplomatic credibility (foundation for all Ukrainian defense cooperation during conflict) suffers potentially irreparable damage when allies discover Ukrainian government failed to detect Russian nation-state targeting for three months during intensive NATO coordination. Strategic policy theft (Russian intelligence obtained Ukrainian vulnerability assessments and defense priorities) enables Russian military to exploit weaknesses Ukrainian government identified before NATO assistance arrives to strengthen defenses.
Olena faces Ukrainian government crisis extending far beyond Ministry boundaries. President Zelenskyy’s wartime strategy depends on robust Western support including cybersecurity cooperation—LitterDrifter compromise potentially undermines broader Ukrainian diplomatic relationships if NATO perceives Ukrainian government cannot protect classified cooperation. Ukrainian critical infrastructure operators (power companies, telecommunications providers, financial institutions) depend on Ministry coordination for defending against Russian attacks—intelligence sharing suspension eliminates real-time threat intelligence these defenders need to prevent Russian military cyber operations from succeeding. Ukrainian military command relies on secure government communications and critical infrastructure resilience—compromises affecting these systems directly impact military operational effectiveness during active combat with Russian forces.
The Ministry must navigate impossible decisions where every option carries catastrophic consequences: proceed with NATO summit while concealing espionage (maintains timeline but creates liability destroying trust when truth emerges), disclose to allies before summit (demonstrates transparency but undermines confidence in Ukrainian operational security when partnership is existential), suspend intelligence sharing during investigation (protects classified information but eliminates threat intelligence Ukrainian defenders need to prevent Russian attacks on critical infrastructure), or continue intelligence exchanges during incomplete assessment (maintains defensive capabilities but risks exposing additional allied intelligence to Russian collection creating permanent trust destruction with partners whose cooperation Ukraine desperately needs for national survival during existential military conflict with sophisticated adversary conducting comprehensive cyber operations against all Ukrainian government operations simultaneously).
Key Stakeholders
Minister Dr. Olena Petrov - Leading Ukrainian national cybersecurity policy during active Russian military conflict, discovering Monday morning that three-month Russian LitterDrifter espionage campaign compromised NATO summit coordination and allied intelligence sharing four days before critical Friday summit where Ukrainian government presents cyber defense needs to 32 NATO member states, must decide whether to proceed with summit without disclosing espionage (maintains timeline enabling allied assistance requests but creates liability destroying NATO trust when compromise inevitably discovered) vs disclose requiring postponement (demonstrates transparency but undermines allied confidence in Ukrainian operational security competence when cyber defense cooperation is existential national security requirement), represents Ukrainian government leader facing crisis where Russian nation-state targeting specifically designed to undermine NATO-Ukraine partnership during wartime has succeeded in creating impossible diplomatic situation where both disclosure and concealment paths lead to erosion of allied trust and defense cooperation supporting Ukrainian critical infrastructure protection against ongoing Russian military cyber operations
Cybersecurity Director Major Alexei Kozlov - Ukrainian military officer managing Ministry cyber defense discovering LitterDrifter USB worm systematically exfiltrated three months of NATO summit planning documents, strategic policy communications, and classified allied intelligence exchanges, must provide damage assessment to allied governments determining scope of intelligence exposure while knowing comprehensive analysis requires weeks but intelligence sharing suspension during investigation eliminates real-time threat intelligence Ukrainian defenders need to protect critical infrastructure from daily Russian attacks, represents cybersecurity professional discovering that wartime operational tempo prioritizing diplomatic mission success over security hygiene created vulnerability enabling Russian espionage to exploit precisely the USB security procedure deferrals and network connectivity decisions that seemed like rational operational choices during intensive NATO coordination under tight summit preparation deadlines where missing diplomatic timeline appeared more threatening than theoretical nation-state targeting risk
Intelligence Liaison Colonel Viktor Shevchenko - Ukrainian intelligence officer coordinating classified information sharing with US Cyber Command, UK GCHQ, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence discovering LitterDrifter compromised intelligence liaison systems potentially exposing three months of allied classified intelligence on Russian cyber operations to Russian counterintelligence, must notify every allied government whose classified intelligence may have been compromised through Ukrainian systems triggering mandatory damage assessments likely resulting in intelligence sharing suspension during active Russian military cyber operations when Ukrainian critical infrastructure defenders depend on real-time allied threat intelligence to prevent Russian attacks, faces allied questions about Ukrainian operational security competence creating credibility crisis where sophisticated Western security services question whether continued classified cooperation with Ukrainian government represents acceptable risk during conflict, represents intelligence professional whose organizational culture assumed “allied intelligence sharing validates Ukrainian security” creating blind spot where receiving classified information from NATO partners became interpreted as implicit certification of Ukrainian protection capabilities rather than recognition that allied governments accept calculated Ukrainian security risks as necessary cost of supporting Ukrainian resistance to Russian military operations
Senior Policy Analyst Maria Doroshenko - Ukrainian government strategic planner discovering LitterDrifter specifically targeted NATO summit coordination repository stealing complete Ukrainian summit strategy including vulnerability assessments revealing which critical infrastructure sectors Ukraine considers most vulnerable to Russian attack, defense assistance requests showing exactly what technologies and support Ukraine plans to request from NATO (€45M specific systems, 200-person training programs, real-time intelligence sharing), diplomatic negotiation positions Ukrainian government developed for international cooperation agreements, providing Russian intelligence comprehensive understanding of Ukrainian defensive priorities enabling Russian military to exploit identified vulnerabilities before NATO assistance arrives while Russian diplomats undermine Ukrainian requests by revealing internal assessments to allied governments, represents policy professional whose individual decision-making during urgent summit preparation led to systematic USB security procedure violations (bypassing device scanning to maintain tight coordination deadlines, prioritizing diplomatic deliverable quality over security compliance) because career success and ministry mission achievement measured through “impressing NATO partners with Ukrainian policy analysis” not “perfect security procedure adherence” creating organizational culture where security systematically lost to mission urgency in individual choices during crisis
Why This Matters
You’re not just responding to malware—you’re managing a Ukrainian government counterintelligence crisis during active military conflict where your incident response must simultaneously balance NATO summit participation critical for securing allied cyber defense assistance supporting Ukrainian critical infrastructure protection, intelligence sharing suspension affecting Ukrainian defenders’ real-time threat intelligence on Russian military cyber operations, diplomatic transparency obligations to 32 allied governments requiring comprehensive espionage disclosure undermining confidence in Ukrainian operational security competence, and strategic intelligence theft where Russian adversary obtained three months of Ukrainian defense planning enabling Russian forces to exploit identified vulnerabilities before NATO assistance arrives. LitterDrifter USB worm nation-state espionage campaign systematically exfiltrated NATO summit coordination documents, strategic policy communications revealing Ukrainian critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments, and classified allied intelligence exchanges on Russian cyber operations—discovery four days before Friday NATO summit means Russian intelligence already knows Ukrainian negotiation positions, defense priorities, and vulnerability assessments potentially compromising summit effectiveness while Ukrainian government cannot assure allies of operational security during classified cooperation. The Tuesday NATO pre-briefing creates immediate diplomatic pressure requiring Ukrainian delegation to assure 32 member states that Ministry maintains adequate operational security for protecting NATO-shared intelligence when forensic evidence shows three-month Russian compromise specifically targeting summit coordination—providing false assurance creates liability when truth emerges, disclosing compromise now derails summit preparation and undermines Ukrainian credibility for defense cooperation during existential national security crisis where cyber defense assistance literally affects Ukrainian ability to protect critical infrastructure from daily Russian military attacks. Allied intelligence agencies (US Cyber Command, UK GCHQ, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, EU cyber threat network) require immediate damage assessment determining whether classified intelligence shared with Ukrainian government over three-month compromise period reached Russian counterintelligence—comprehensive analysis needs weeks but intelligence sharing suspension during investigation eliminates real-time threat intelligence Ukrainian critical infrastructure defenders need to prevent Russian cyber operations targeting power grids, telecommunications, government networks supporting Ukrainian resistance to Russian invasion. Strategic policy theft provides Russian military comprehensive intelligence on Ukrainian defensive strategy: which critical infrastructure sectors Ukraine assesses as most vulnerable (enabling Russian targeting before Ukrainian defenses strengthen), what cyber defense assistance Ukraine plans to request from NATO (allowing Russian diplomatic efforts to undermine requests), Ukrainian government’s internal assessment of Russian cyber threat capabilities (revealing what Ukrainian intelligence knows about Russian operations enabling Russian countermeasures). The Ministry organizational culture created this vulnerability: wartime operational tempo prioritizing diplomatic mission execution over security hygiene led to systematic USB security procedure deferrals when summit preparation deadlines conflicted with scanning requirements, international cooperation culture assuming allied intelligence sharing validated Ukrainian security created blind spot where receiving NATO classified information became interpreted as certification of Ukrainian protection capabilities rather than recognition of accepted risk, nation-state threat perception focusing on destructive attacks missed subtle espionage reconnaissance because threat model expected “Russian cyber attacks are loud and destructive” rather than quiet intelligence collection, USB security policies relying on individual user compliance failed when time-pressured government employees made rational decisions prioritizing diplomatic mission success over security procedures during urgent NATO coordination. You must decide whether to proceed with Friday NATO summit without disclosing three-month Russian espionage (maintains timeline enabling Ukrainian defense assistance requests and preserves summit credibility BUT creates massive liability when allies inevitably discover compromise through counterintelligence destroying NATO trust permanently when Ukrainian government appears to have concealed Russian targeting from partners), disclose to allies before summit requiring postponement pending damage assessment (demonstrates Ukrainian transparency and accountability BUT signals Ukrainian government cannot protect NATO classified cooperation during active conflict undermining allied confidence in partnership when cyber defense assistance is critical national security requirement supporting Ukrainian resistance), suspend intelligence sharing until comprehensive investigation confirms no ongoing Russian access (protects allied classified information and demonstrates counterintelligence responsibility BUT eliminates real-time threat intelligence Ukrainian critical infrastructure defenders need to prevent Russian attacks during daily military cyber operations), or continue intelligence exchanges during incomplete assessment maintaining defensive capabilities (preserves Ukrainian access to allied threat intelligence supporting critical infrastructure protection BUT risks exposing additional classified information to Russian collection creating permanent allied trust destruction). There’s no option that proceeds with scheduled NATO summit, maintains classified intelligence cooperation with allied governments, provides comprehensive espionage disclosure demonstrating Ukrainian transparency, preserves allied confidence in Ukrainian operational security competence, and prevents Russian military exploitation of stolen strategic intelligence on Ukrainian defensive priorities. You must choose what matters most when NATO partnership survival, intelligence sharing continuity, diplomatic credibility preservation, and critical infrastructure defense all demand conflicting priorities during Russian nation-state espionage campaign specifically engineered to undermine NATO-Ukraine cybersecurity cooperation by creating impossible situation where Ukrainian government faces diplomatic catastrophe regardless of incident response decisions because both disclosure and concealment paths lead to erosion of allied trust supporting Ukrainian national survival during existential military conflict with sophisticated adversary conducting comprehensive cyber operations against Ukrainian government.
IM Facilitation Notes
- Players may assume NATO allies will understand wartime security challenges - Emphasize that allied governments evaluate operational security competence not wartime circumstances: three-month undetected Russian espionage during intensive NATO coordination demonstrates Ukrainian government inability to protect classified cooperation regardless of conflict pressures or resource constraints, facility clearance and intelligence sharing frameworks measure ability to safeguard partner nation secrets where meeting industry baseline security is minimum expectation not achievement deserving special consideration, NATO member states balance supporting Ukrainian resistance against risks of sharing classified intelligence with government that cannot prevent Russian collection, allied confidence in Ukrainian partnership depends on demonstrating operational security competence when requesting €45M defense assistance and real-time classified threat intelligence
- Players may expect intelligence sharing to continue during investigation - Clarify that allied governments cannot share classified intelligence with compromised systems regardless of Ukrainian defensive needs: US Cyber Command, UK GCHQ, NATO centers of excellence have legal obligations preventing classified information sharing until damage assessment confirms no ongoing adversary access, intelligence suspension is administrative standard procedure protecting allied secrets not punitive action against Ukrainian government, comprehensive forensic investigation determining intelligence exposure scope requires weeks meaning threat intelligence flow stops immediately affecting Ukrainian critical infrastructure defenders’ real-time awareness of Russian military cyber targeting, wartime operational urgency doesn’t override allied counterintelligence requirements prioritizing classified information protection over partnership convenience
- Players may believe disclosure will strengthen allied trust through transparency - Address diplomatic reality where comprehensive espionage disclosure undermines confidence in Ukrainian operational security: NATO member states evaluating whether Ukraine can responsibly handle classified cooperation interpret three-month undetected Russian targeting as fundamental security competence failure that sophisticated adversary explanation doesn’t mitigate, summit partnership discussions depend on allied governments trusting Ukrainian ability to protect NATO-shared intelligence when disclosure reveals precisely this capability is inadequate, Ukrainian transparency about security failure doesn’t compensate for operational incompetence affecting allied willingness to share classified threat intelligence and cyber defense technology, competitive international environment means allied governments comparing Ukrainian partnership against other cooperation opportunities where partners demonstrate superior operational security
- Players may underestimate strategic intelligence theft impact - Explain that Russian military obtaining Ukrainian vulnerability assessments and defense priorities enables operational exploitation: Ukrainian government internal analysis revealing which critical infrastructure sectors assessed as most vulnerable (power generation in eastern conflict zones, telecommunications supporting military operations) provides Russian targeting priorities for cyber operations, NATO defense assistance requests showing specific technologies and training programs Ukraine plans to request allows Russian forces to develop countermeasures before Ukrainian capabilities arrive, diplomatic negotiation positions for cybersecurity cooperation agreements enable Russian diplomatic efforts to undermine Ukrainian requests by revealing internal Ukrainian assessments to allied governments creating perception of Ukrainian desperation or unrealistic expectations
- Players may want to minimize disclosure to preserve summit participation - Highlight legal and counterintelligence exposure where incomplete disclosure creates worse outcome than transparency: allied intelligence agencies will discover full compromise scope through their own counterintelligence investigations regardless of Ukrainian disclosure completeness, Ukrainian government limiting disclosure to confirmed compromises while withholding suspected exposures creates liability when allies learn Ukrainian concealed potential intelligence compromise from partners whose classified information Ukrainian government failed to protect, professional intelligence community relationships depend on trustworthy disclosure where hiding espionage scope destroys credibility permanently when truth emerges through independent allied discovery, incomplete disclosure combines worst aspects of both transparency (admitting security failure) and concealment (appearing dishonest about scope) without benefits of either approach
- Players may propose operational security improvements as immediate response - Address diplomatic perception that post-compromise security enhancement doesn’t restore lost trust: implementing USB security controls and network segmentation after three-month Russian espionage demonstrates Ukrainian government responds to failures but doesn’t prove capability to prevent future targeting, NATO allies evaluating partnership viability focus on Ukrainian operational security competence before compromise not improvement plans after Russian success, security program enhancements require time to implement and validate while summit timeline and intelligence sharing decisions proceed based on current demonstrated capabilities not promised future improvements, Ukrainian government must demonstrate can protect classified cooperation now during active conflict when allied assistance is needed not pledge hypothetical security adequacy after comprehensive program overhaul
- Players may expect rapid investigation resolution before Friday summit - Explain counterintelligence investigation timeline incompatible with diplomatic deadlines: comprehensive damage assessment determining full scope of Russian intelligence collection, allied classified information exposure, and systemic compromise requires forensic analysis across three-month timeline examining thousands of government documents and communications, Ukrainian Ministry cannot accelerate investigation through additional resources because thoroughness matters more than speed when assessing strategic intelligence theft affecting NATO cooperation and allied trust, Friday summit deadline is Ukrainian diplomatic requirement that doesn’t change counterintelligence investigative needs or allied governments’ mandatory assessment timelines, incomplete rapid assessment risks understating Russian intelligence gains creating legal liability when fuller analysis later reveals broader compromise than Ukrainian government initially reported to NATO partners whose classified intelligence was exposed through Ukrainian systems during active military conflict
Opening Presentation
“It’s Monday morning at the Ministry of Digital Infrastructure, and the government agency is coordinating national cybersecurity policy as regional tensions escalate toward a critical NATO summit on Friday. But IT staff have discovered something alarming: USB-based malware specifically targeting Ukrainian-language systems and government networks. This isn’t random malware - it’s an advanced nation-state worm propagating through removable media, systematically collecting intelligence on government operations and strategic planning during active geopolitical conflict.”
Initial Symptoms to Present:
Key Discovery Paths:
Detective Investigation Leads:
Protector System Analysis:
Tracker Network Investigation:
Communicator Stakeholder Interviews:
Mid-Scenario Pressure Points:
- Hour 1: NATO allies discover potential compromise of summit coordination affecting international security cooperation
- Hour 2: Counterintelligence investigation reveals evidence of nation-state targeting of Ukrainian government operations during conflict
- Hour 3: Strategic policy documents found on nation-state intelligence networks affecting diplomatic operations and national security
- Hour 4: Intelligence assessment indicates potential compromise of multiple Ukrainian government ministries and international coordination
Evolution Triggers:
- If investigation reveals diplomatic intelligence transfer, international security coordination and NATO relationships are compromised
- If nation-state surveillance continues, adversaries maintain persistent access for long-term government intelligence collection during conflict
- If strategic policy theft is confirmed, national security and diplomatic operations are severely compromised affecting geopolitical position
Resolution Pathways:
Technical Success Indicators:
- Complete nation-state worm removal from government systems with preservation of counterintelligence evidence
- Strategic communications security verified preventing further unauthorized nation-state access during conflict
- Foreign espionage infrastructure analysis provides intelligence on coordinated government targeting and geopolitical objectives
Business Success Indicators:
- NATO summit coordination protected through secure forensic handling and international intelligence cooperation
- Government operations maintained through professional incident response and security demonstration to allies
- National security compliance demonstrated preventing diplomatic embarrassment and international relationship damage
Learning Success Indicators:
- Team understands sophisticated nation-state espionage capabilities and long-term government targeting through USB propagation during conflict
- Participants recognize geopolitical targeting and national security implications of strategic policy theft
- Group demonstrates coordination between cybersecurity response and counterintelligence investigation requirements for government operations
Common IM Facilitation Challenges:
If Nation-State Sophistication Is Underestimated:
“Your USB malware removal is progressing, but Colonel Shevchenko discovered that nation-state adversaries have been systematically collecting government intelligence for months through geopolitical targeting. How does sophisticated foreign espionage change your counterintelligence approach during active conflict?”
If Diplomatic Implications Are Ignored:
“While you’re cleaning infected systems, Minister Petrov needs to know: have strategic policy documents been transferred to nation-state adversaries targeting NATO summit coordination? How do you coordinate cybersecurity response with international counterintelligence investigation?”
If Strategic Impact Is Overlooked:
“Maria just learned that diplomatic communications may be in nation-state hands affecting international cooperation. How do you assess the national security impact of stolen strategic government intelligence during geopolitical conflict?”
Success Metrics for Session:
Template Compatibility
Quick Demo (35-40 min)
- Rounds: 1
- Actions per Player: 1
- Investigation: Guided
- Response: Pre-defined
- Focus: Use the “Hook” and “Initial Symptoms” to quickly establish nation-state government espionage crisis. Present the “Guided Investigation Clues” at 5-minute intervals. Offer the “Pre-Defined Response Options” for the team to choose from. Quick debrief should focus on recognizing geopolitical targeting and strategic communications security implications.
Lunch & Learn (75-90 min)
- Rounds: 2
- Actions per Player: 2
- Investigation: Guided
- Response: Pre-defined
- Focus: This template allows for deeper exploration of geopolitical government espionage challenges. Use the full set of NPCs to create realistic NATO summit and counterintelligence pressures. The two rounds allow discovery of diplomatic communications theft and international coordination targeting, raising stakes. Debrief can explore balance between cybersecurity response and national security coordination.
Full Game (120-140 min)
- Rounds: 3
- Actions per Player: 2
- Investigation: Open
- Response: Creative
- Focus: Players have freedom to investigate using the “Key Discovery Paths” as IM guidance. They must develop response strategies balancing NATO summit coordination, strategic policy protection, counterintelligence cooperation, and national security obligations. The three rounds allow for full narrative arc including nation-state discovery, diplomatic impact assessment, and international intelligence coordination.
Advanced Challenge (150-170 min)
- Rounds: 3
- Actions per Player: 2
- Investigation: Open
- Response: Creative
- Complexity: Add red herrings (e.g., legitimate government communications causing false positives). Make containment ambiguous, requiring players to justify counterintelligence decisions with incomplete strategic information about geopolitical targeting during active conflict. Remove access to reference materials to test knowledge recall of nation-state behavior and government security principles. Include deep coordination with NATO allies and Ukrainian conflict implications.
Quick Demo Materials (35-40 min)
Guided Investigation Clues
Clue 1 (Minute 5): “Digital forensics reveal sophisticated nation-state USB-propagating worm (Litter Drifter) targeting Ministry of Digital Infrastructure government workstations with Ukrainian-language system detection. Security analysis shows foreign intelligence systematically collecting strategic policy documents through USB devices affecting government operations during active geopolitical conflict. Government staff report USB malware spreading automatically during NATO summit coordination affecting national security and diplomatic planning.”
Clue 2 (Minute 10): “Counterintelligence timeline indicates nation-state surveillance maintained for months through targeted USB devices distributed to Ukrainian government organizations. Command and control traffic analysis reveals geopolitical espionage infrastructure coordinating multi-target government intelligence collection supporting foreign conflict objectives. Strategic system assessment shows unauthorized access to diplomatic communications and policy documents affecting NATO cooperation and international relations during regional tensions.”
Clue 3 (Minute 15): “Allied counterintelligence investigation discovers strategic policy documents on nation-state intelligence networks confirming diplomatic information transfer affecting international security cooperation. NATO coordination reveals potential compromise of summit planning threatening alliance relationships and collective defense operations. Intelligence assessment indicates coordinated nation-state targeting of multiple Ukrainian government ministries requiring immediate counterintelligence response and international cooperation coordination.”
Pre-Defined Response Options
Option A: Emergency Government Isolation & International Coordination
- Action: Immediately isolate compromised government systems from USB propagation, coordinate comprehensive counterintelligence investigation with allied intelligence agencies, conduct strategic damage assessment for diplomatic communications exposure, implement emergency security protocols for NATO summit protection and international notification.
- Pros: Completely eliminates nation-state worm preventing further strategic intelligence theft through USB propagation; demonstrates responsible national security incident management; maintains international relationships through transparent counterintelligence coordination with allies.
- Cons: Government system isolation disrupts NATO summit coordination affecting international security cooperation; counterintelligence investigation requires extensive allied intelligence coordination; damage assessment may reveal significant diplomatic communications compromise affecting geopolitical relationships.
- Type Effectiveness: Super effective against APT malmon type; complete nation-state worm removal prevents continued strategic surveillance and diplomatic intelligence theft through USB propagation during conflict.
Option B: Forensic Preservation & Targeted Remediation
- Action: Preserve counterintelligence evidence while remediating confirmed compromised systems, conduct targeted strategic damage assessment, coordinate selective allied notification with intelligence agencies, implement enhanced monitoring while maintaining government operations.
- Pros: Balances NATO summit requirements with counterintelligence investigation; protects critical government operations; enables focused national security response and diplomatic coordination.
- Cons: Risks continued nation-state surveillance in undetected USB propagation locations; selective remediation may miss coordinated targeting; forensic requirements may delay strategic communications protection and summit coordination.
- Type Effectiveness: Moderately effective against APT threats; reduces but doesn’t eliminate nation-state presence through USB propagation; delays complete government security restoration and international cooperation.
Option C: Diplomatic Continuity & Phased Security Response
- Action: Implement emergency secure NATO summit coordination environment isolated from USB threats, phase nation-state worm removal by strategic priority, establish enhanced government monitoring, coordinate gradual counterintelligence notification while maintaining diplomatic operations.
- Pros: Maintains critical NATO summit timeline protecting international security cooperation; enables continued government operations during conflict; supports controlled allied coordination and diplomatic notification.
- Cons: Phased approach extends nation-state surveillance timeline through continued USB propagation; emergency operations may not prevent continued strategic intelligence theft; gradual notification delays may violate international security coordination requirements.
- Type Effectiveness: Partially effective against APT malmon type; prioritizes diplomatic operations over complete nation-state elimination through USB propagation; doesn’t guarantee strategic communications protection or national security.
Lunch & Learn Materials (75-90 min, 2 rounds)
Round 1: Nation-State Discovery & Government Intelligence Assessment (35-40 min)
Investigation Clues (Time-Stamped)
Minute 0-5 (Opening):
- Security alert: USB devices showing automated propagation behavior targeting Ukrainian-language government systems
- Strategic policy documents accessed through unauthorized means during NATO summit coordination
- Network traffic patterns indicating potential data exfiltration to foreign command infrastructure during regional conflict
Minute 10 (Detective Path):
- Digital forensics identify sophisticated USB-propagating worm (Litter Drifter) with nation-state tradecraft targeting government operations
- Malware designed specifically to target Ukrainian government networks with language detection capabilities
- Timeline analysis reveals potential months of undetected presence during active geopolitical tensions
Minute 15 (Protector Path):
- Government workstation monitoring reveals systematic file access patterns targeting diplomatic communications and policy documents
- Strategic system logs show unauthorized data collection from government operations servers during conflict
- USB propagation patterns indicate coordinated campaign affecting multiple Ukrainian government ministries
Minute 20 (Tracker Path):
- Command and control infrastructure analysis reveals nation-state espionage network with geopolitical conflict objectives
- Exfiltration patterns suggest intelligence collection focused on NATO summit coordination and Ukrainian strategic planning
- Network traffic correlates with known foreign intelligence operations targeting government during regional tensions
Minute 25 (Communicator Path):
- Policy Analyst Maria Doroshenko reports suspicious USB behavior during strategic planning over past 3 months
- Cybersecurity Director Major Kozlov identifies potential foreign intelligence collection affecting diplomatic operations
- Minister Petrov expresses urgent concern about NATO summit schedule and allied notification requirements
Response Options (With Detailed Trade-offs)
Option A: Emergency Government Isolation & Full International Coordination
- Immediate Actions: Isolate all compromised government systems, initiate comprehensive counterintelligence investigation with allies, conduct strategic damage assessment
- Timeline Impact: NATO summit coordination delayed 2-3 weeks for complete forensic analysis and security verification
- Stakeholder Reactions:
- Minister Petrov: Concerned about summit timeline but supports national security priority and allied transparency
- Major Kozlov: Strongly supports comprehensive counterintelligence investigation and NATO coordination
- Colonel Shevchenko: Emphasizes complete evidence preservation for foreign intelligence investigation and allied cooperation
- Type Effectiveness: SUPER EFFECTIVE - Complete APT removal prevents continued nation-state surveillance and strategic intelligence theft
Option B: Forensic Preservation & Targeted Remediation
- Immediate Actions: Preserve counterintelligence evidence, remediate confirmed compromised systems, conduct targeted strategic damage assessment
- Timeline Impact: Partial summit delay (5-7 days) while maintaining critical diplomatic coordination operations
- Stakeholder Reactions:
- Minister Petrov: Appreciates balance between summit requirements and security response
- Maria Doroshenko: Can continue critical policy work with enhanced monitoring
- Colonel Shevchenko: Concerned about potential nation-state surveillance in undetected locations
- Type Effectiveness: MODERATELY EFFECTIVE - Reduces nation-state presence but may not achieve complete elimination
Option C: Diplomatic Continuity & Phased Security Response
- Immediate Actions: Implement emergency secure summit environment, phase worm removal by strategic priority, establish enhanced monitoring
- Timeline Impact: Minimal summit delay (1-2 days) with ongoing security remediation during diplomatic operations
- Stakeholder Reactions:
- Minister Petrov: Strongly supports maintaining summit schedule and international cooperation timeline
- Major Kozlov: Serious concerns about inadequate counterintelligence response and national security compliance
- Colonel Shevchenko: Warns that phased approach may violate international intelligence coordination requirements
- Type Effectiveness: PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE - Prioritizes diplomatic operations over complete nation-state elimination
Round 1 Pressure Events
Minute 15: NATO allies request status update on summit coordination security and government communications protection
Minute 25: Intelligence services initiate inquiry about potential strategic policy compromise affecting international security cooperation
Minute 30: Minister Petrov receives call from allied diplomats - summit has critical importance for collective defense and Ukrainian support
Round 1 Facilitation Questions
- “How do you balance NATO summit urgency against comprehensive counterintelligence investigation requirements during conflict?”
- “What strategic communications exposure assessment is needed before allied notification?”
- “How does nation-state targeting of Ukrainian government operations affect your response strategy?”
- “What international security coordination obligations apply to this foreign intelligence collection incident?”
Round 1 Transition to Round 2
Based on team’s chosen response path…
If Emergency Isolation Chosen: “Your emergency government isolation has halted nation-state surveillance, but forensic analysis is revealing the extent of strategic policy exposure. Allied counterintelligence investigation has discovered something alarming about the scope of diplomatic communications theft and geopolitical targeting…”
If Targeted Remediation Chosen: “Your forensic preservation is protecting critical evidence, but continued monitoring is detecting ongoing nation-state activity in unexpected government locations. Colonel Shevchenko has discovered intelligence indicating systematic targeting of multiple Ukrainian ministries during conflict…”
If Diplomatic Continuity Chosen: “Your secure summit environment is maintaining coordination schedule, but Major Kozlov has identified serious national security compliance concerns. Allied intelligence is revealing that strategic policy documents may already be in nation-state hands…”
Round 2: Diplomatic Impact & NATO Coordination (35-45 min)
Investigation Clues (Time-Stamped)
Minute 40 (Critical Discovery):
- Counterintelligence investigation reveals strategic policy documents found on nation-state intelligence networks
- Forensic timeline indicates systematic diplomatic communications theft over 6-month period through USB propagation during conflict
- Intelligence assessment shows potential compromise of NATO summit planning affecting international security cooperation
Minute 50 (Escalation):
- Allied intelligence confirms multiple Ukrainian government ministries experiencing similar nation-state targeting
- Strategic damage assessment reveals diplomatic communications and policy specifications transferred to foreign intelligence
- National security concerns about international coordination in adversary hands during geopolitical conflict
Minute 55 (Stakeholder Pressure):
- Minister Petrov faces allied inquiry about summit timeline and strategic communications protection
- Major Kozlov must coordinate international reporting under intelligence cooperation requirements
- Maria Doroshenko reports government staff morale concerns and diplomatic credibility implications
Minute 65 (Final Pressure):
- NATO coordination office considering whether summit can proceed given nation-state compromise
- Intelligence services require comprehensive incident report and remediation verification
- Allied agencies assess geopolitical implications of Ukrainian government targeting during conflict
Response Options for Final Resolution
Option A: Complete Nation-State Elimination & Allied Security Demonstration
- Actions: Full government system rebuild with international intelligence verification, comprehensive strategic communications damage assessment, transparent NATO coordination
- Business Impact: Significant summit delay (3-4 weeks) but maintains long-term allied relationships and national security credibility
- National Security Impact: Demonstrates responsible government incident management and international security cooperation
- Learning Focus: Understanding nation-state sophistication and government obligations to diplomatic operations and allied trust
Option B: Verified Remediation & Accelerated Summit Recovery
- Actions: Complete confirmed worm removal with allied intelligence oversight, targeted strategic communications security verification, expedited NATO notification
- Business Impact: Moderate summit delay (1-2 weeks) with intensive coordination to resume diplomatic operations
- National Security Impact: Balances summit requirements with counterintelligence investigation needs
- Learning Focus: Navigating international security compliance while maintaining strategic diplomatic capabilities
Option C: Risk Acceptance & Enhanced Monitoring Approach
- Actions: Document residual nation-state risk, implement enhanced government monitoring, maintain summit schedule with security caveats
- Business Impact: Minimal summit delay but potential long-term national security concerns and allied relationship risks
- National Security Impact: May violate international intelligence coordination requirements and affect geopolitical partnerships during conflict
- Learning Focus: Understanding consequences of inadequate response to nation-state targeting of government operations
Victory Conditions
Technical Victory:
- Complete nation-state worm removal from government systems with preservation of counterintelligence evidence
- Strategic communications security verified preventing further unauthorized nation-state access during conflict
- Foreign espionage infrastructure analyzed providing intelligence on government targeting and allied cooperation
Business Victory:
- NATO summit coordination protected through secure forensic handling and international intelligence cooperation
- Government operations maintained through professional incident response and allied trust demonstration
- National security compliance demonstrated preventing diplomatic embarrassment and relationship damage
Learning Victory:
- Team understands sophisticated nation-state espionage capabilities and long-term government targeting during conflict
- Participants recognize geopolitical implications of strategic policy theft and diplomatic compromise
- Group demonstrates coordination between cybersecurity response and counterintelligence investigation for government operations
Debrief Topics (15-20 min)
Nation-State Sophistication: How did Litter Drifter’s USB propagation and language detection enable months of undetected government surveillance during conflict?
Geopolitical Targeting: Why do nation-state adversaries target Ukrainian government operations and NATO coordination during regional tensions?
International Security Obligations: What allied intelligence coordination and counterintelligence cooperation requirements apply to strategic policy compromise?
Diplomatic Impact Balance: How do you weigh NATO summit urgency against comprehensive security investigation during active conflict?
Long-term Implications: What strategic diplomatic and national security consequences result from government intelligence in adversary hands?
Full Game Materials (120-140 min, 3 rounds)
Round 1: Initial Nation-State Detection (30-35 min)
Open Investigation Framework
Detective Investigation Options:
- Analyze USB device forensics for nation-state malware indicators and Ukrainian-language targeting mechanisms
- Investigate government network logs for unauthorized strategic policy access patterns during conflict
- Research Litter Drifter attribution and known Ukrainian government targeting campaigns
- Examine digital forensics for foreign intelligence collection and diplomatic exfiltration methods
Protector System Analysis Options:
- Assess government workstation security for systematic diplomatic communications theft indicators
- Evaluate strategic system integrity and policy document protection during conflict coordination
- Monitor USB propagation patterns affecting multiple government ministry workstations
- Review national security controls for nation-state persistence mechanisms
Tracker Network Investigation Options:
- Trace command and control infrastructure for nation-state espionage network identification during conflict
- Analyze exfiltration patterns for strategic policy and NATO coordination targeting
- Investigate network traffic for geopolitical intelligence collection during regional tensions
- Map foreign intelligence infrastructure connections to known adversary conflict operations
Communicator Stakeholder Interviews:
- Interview government staff about suspicious USB behavior during strategic planning and summit coordination
- Coordinate with Minister Petrov on NATO summit priorities and allied expectations
- Consult with Major Kozlov on national security requirements and diplomatic implications
- Engage Colonel Shevchenko on counterintelligence investigation protocols and allied intelligence coordination
NPC Interactions (Realistic Conflicts)
Minister Dr. Olena Petrov:
- Priority: Maintain NATO summit schedule - international security cooperation depends on Friday coordination
- Concern: Allied inquiry about security posture and strategic communications protection during conflict
- Conflict: Pushes for diplomatic continuity approach to avoid summit delays affecting collective defense
- Information: Summit coordination represents critical diplomatic effort for Ukrainian support and geopolitical position
Major Alexei Kozlov (Cybersecurity Director):
- Priority: National security compliance and international intelligence coordination requirements for strategic compromise
- Concern: Government credibility implications and diplomatic trust during counterintelligence investigation
- Conflict: Demands comprehensive allied investigation regardless of summit timeline impact
- Information: Intelligence services have specific protocols for foreign espionage incidents affecting government operations
Maria Doroshenko (Senior Policy Analyst):
- Priority: Government staff safety and strategic policy work continuity during conflict
- Concern: USB security practices and potential exposure of diplomatic communications
- Conflict: Caught between summit pressure and national security review concerns
- Information: Staff have been using USB devices for policy document sharing for months - standard government practice
Colonel Viktor Shevchenko (Intelligence Liaison):
- Priority: Evidence preservation for foreign intelligence investigation and attribution during conflict
- Concern: Geopolitical implications of Ukrainian government operation targeting and NATO coordination compromise
- Conflict: International investigation requirements may conflict with diplomatic continuity needs
- Information: Intelligence indicates coordinated nation-state campaign targeting multiple Ukrainian ministries during regional tensions
Round 1 Pressure Events
Minute 10: Security alert - additional government workstations showing USB propagation indicators during forensic investigation
Minute 20: NATO coordination office requests immediate status report on summit security and strategic communications protection
Minute 25: Intelligence service notification requirement triggers - allied reporting deadline in 24 hours for diplomatic compromise
Round 1 Facilitation Questions
- “What forensic evidence do you need before determining the scope of nation-state surveillance during conflict?”
- “How do you assess whether strategic policy documents have been exfiltrated to foreign intelligence?”
- “What immediate containment actions balance NATO summit urgency with counterintelligence preservation?”
- “How do you coordinate with multiple stakeholders who have conflicting but legitimate government priorities?”
Round 2: Strategic Policy Compromise Assessment (40-50 min)
Open Investigation Continuation
Detective Deep Dive:
- Conduct comprehensive forensic timeline of nation-state surveillance and strategic policy access during conflict
- Analyze foreign intelligence collection targeting NATO summit coordination and Ukrainian government operations
- Investigate diplomatic communications exposed through systematic espionage during regional tensions
- Examine USB propagation vectors and nation-state persistence across government ministries
Protector Impact Analysis:
- Assess government system compromise extent affecting diplomatic capabilities and strategic communications
- Evaluate national security controls failures enabling months of undetected surveillance during conflict
- Review USB device management practices and government network segmentation
- Analyze potential diplomatic security impact of strategic policy in adversary hands
Tracker Intelligence Correlation:
- Map nation-state command infrastructure to known foreign intelligence operations during conflict
- Correlate exfiltration timing with geopolitical events and Ukrainian conflict escalation
- Investigate multi-target government ministry targeting patterns indicating coordinated campaign
- Analyze threat intelligence for Litter Drifter attribution and strategic conflict objectives
Communicator Crisis Management:
- Coordinate NATO notification and summit coordination implications
- Manage allied intelligence reporting and counterintelligence investigation cooperation
- Address government staff diplomatic credibility concerns and morale during investigation
- Facilitate international intelligence agency coordination for geopolitical assessment
NPC Evolution (Escalating Conflicts)
Minister Petrov (Under Allied Pressure):
- New Development: NATO coordination officer questions whether summit can proceed given nation-state compromise
- Escalated Concern: International security cooperation at risk - collective defense depends on summit success
- Increased Conflict: Demands clear timeline for security verification to salvage Friday summit or minimize delay
- Critical Information: Allied partners considering alternative coordination if Ministry cannot ensure secure operations
Major Kozlov (National Security Crisis):
- New Development: Intelligence services initiate formal strategic communications compromise investigation
- Escalated Concern: Government credibility at stake with allies during counterintelligence review
- Increased Conflict: International reporting requires disclosure of full diplomatic communications exposure
- Critical Information: Similar incidents at other governments resulted in diplomatic trust damage and partnership concerns
Maria Doroshenko (Government Staff Under Pressure):
- New Development: Staff facing questions about USB device usage and strategic policy handling during conflict
- Escalated Concern: Team morale collapsing - fear of diplomatic career damage affecting productivity
- Increased Conflict: Defensive about standard government practices - “this is how policy work happens” mentality
- Critical Information: Multiple staff received suspicious USB devices from “trusted” government contacts
Colonel Shevchenko (Geopolitical Intelligence):
- New Development: Intelligence confirms strategic policy documents found on nation-state networks
- Escalated Concern: NATO coordination systematically targeted - geopolitical implications for international partnerships
- Increased Conflict: International investigation taking priority over diplomatic continuity - evidence preservation critical
- Critical Information: Nation-state adversaries now have intelligence on Ukrainian government operations and allied coordination
Round 2 Pressure Events
Minute 45: Counterintelligence investigation discovers diplomatic communications on foreign intelligence networks - confirmed strategic transfer
Minute 55: Allied intelligence officials arrive for strategic damage assessment and security posture review
Minute 65: Intelligence assessment indicates potential compromise of multiple NATO coordination operations across Ukrainian government
Minute 70: Media reports about nation-state targeting of government operations - public relations concerns about Ministry security practices
Round 2 Facilitation Questions
- “Now that strategic policy documents are confirmed in adversary hands, how does this change your response strategy?”
- “What diplomatic security implications exist for NATO coordination compromised by nation-state espionage during conflict?”
- “How do you balance government staff morale and credibility concerns with comprehensive counterintelligence investigation?”
- “What long-term allied relationship implications result from inadequate response to nation-state targeting?”
Round 3: Strategic Resolution & Allied Coordination (40-50 min)
Final Investigation & Resolution
Detective Final Analysis:
- Complete nation-state attribution and government ministry targeting pattern analysis
- Document comprehensive forensic evidence for counterintelligence investigation and diplomatic assessment
- Assess long-term geopolitical implications of strategic policy in foreign hands during conflict
- Develop lessons learned for government USB security and strategic network protection
Protector Security Restoration:
- Implement complete nation-state worm removal with international intelligence verification
- Rebuild government environment with enhanced national security controls
- Establish ongoing monitoring for nation-state persistence and USB propagation
- Verify strategic communications security for potential NATO summit resumption
Tracker Threat Intelligence:
- Provide comprehensive foreign intelligence infrastructure analysis to allied agencies
- Document geopolitical targeting patterns affecting Ukrainian government operations during conflict
- Support attribution assessment for diplomatic and strategic response coordination
- Share government sector threat intelligence with NATO partners
Communicator Strategic Coordination:
- Finalize NATO notification and summit coordination status resolution
- Complete allied intelligence reporting and counterintelligence investigation cooperation
- Address diplomatic credibility implications and government staff recovery planning
- Coordinate public relations response to media coverage of nation-state targeting
Final NPC Resolutions
Minister Petrov (Strategic Decision):
Requires team to present recommendation on NATO summit status:
- Can summit coordination proceed with security verification?
- What timeline is realistic for secure strategic communications restoration?
- How does Ministry demonstrate ongoing security commitment to NATO allies?
- What international cooperation impact results from nation-state compromise during conflict?
Major Kozlov (Compliance Verification):
Demands comprehensive incident resolution documentation:
- Complete strategic communications exposure assessment for allied reporting
- Government credibility status for international trust restoration
- National security controls improvement plan for ongoing diplomatic operations
- Counterintelligence investigation cooperation and evidence delivery to allies
Maria Doroshenko (Team Recovery):
Seeks clarity on government staff future:
- What diplomatic implications exist for staff who used compromised USB devices?
- How does Ministry support team recovery from investigation stress during conflict?
- What new strategic handling procedures prevent future nation-state targeting?
- Can government staff credibility be restored with NATO and allied partners?
Colonel Shevchenko (Geopolitical Assessment):
Provides final counterintelligence context:
- Nation-state campaign confirmed targeting 8+ Ukrainian government ministries during conflict
- Strategic policy compromise provides adversaries intelligence advantage during regional tensions
- Geopolitical response requires coordination between government, intelligence community, and diplomatic channels
- Ministry response quality affects broader Ukrainian government security posture and international partnerships
Round 3 Pressure Events
Minute 85: NATO makes final decision on summit coordination - requires team recommendation with security justification
Minute 95: Intelligence services complete assessment - diplomatic credibility and allied trust depend on incident response quality
Minute 105: Allied intelligence agencies coordinate with Ukrainian government partners - geopolitical implications of strategic compromise
Minute 110: Government sector briefing scheduled - Ministry experience becomes case study for nation-state threat awareness during conflict
Victory Condition Assessment
Technical Victory Indicators:
Business Victory Indicators:
Learning Victory Indicators:
Debrief Topics (20-25 min)
- Nation-State APT Sophistication:
- How did Litter Drifter’s USB propagation and Ukrainian-language detection enable months of undetected government surveillance?
- What government ministry targeting patterns indicate coordinated nation-state campaign during conflict?
- Why is attribution important for diplomatic and strategic response?
- Government Security Obligations:
- What international intelligence coordination and counterintelligence cooperation requirements apply?
- How do diplomatic credibility processes protect strategic communications?
- What intelligence service oversight ensures government security during conflict?
- Geopolitical Context:
- Why do nation-state adversaries target Ukrainian government operations and NATO coordination?
- What strategic advantage do adversaries gain from diplomatic communications compromise during conflict?
- How do hybrid warfare operations integrate cyber espionage with kinetic military actions?
- Diplomatic-Security Balance:
- How do you weigh NATO summit urgency against comprehensive security investigation?
- What long-term allied relationship implications result from incident response quality?
- When is it appropriate to accept summit delays for national security priorities?
- USB Security in Government Environments:
- What makes USB devices particularly dangerous in government ministry settings during conflict?
- How should strategic networks handle removable media given espionage risks?
- What technical controls and user training prevent nation-state USB propagation?
- Lessons for Real-World IR:
- How do nation-state incidents differ from criminal malware in government investigation requirements?
- What makes government incidents unique compared to commercial sector?
- When should cybersecurity teams escalate to counterintelligence and allied intelligence agencies?
Advanced Challenge Materials (150-170 min, 3+ rounds)
Advanced Challenge Modifications
Remove Reference Materials:
- No access to Malmon compendium for Litter Drifter technical details
- Must recall nation-state behavior patterns and government targeting from training during conflict
- Test knowledge of international intelligence coordination and allied cooperation protocols
- Challenge players to remember USB propagation mechanisms and APT persistence techniques
Add Red Herrings:
- Legitimate government policy work causing false positive USB activity alerts
- Routine strategic document transfers appearing as suspicious exfiltration in logs during summit coordination
- Authorized NATO security audit traffic resembling nation-state command and control
- Standard allied partner coordination emails flagged as potential intelligence collection
Ambiguous Containment Scenarios:
- Forensic evidence suggests possible nation-state removal but residual indicators persist
- Conflicting intelligence about whether diplomatic communications were fully exfiltrated
- Uncertain timeline of initial compromise during conflict - may predate current logging
- Multiple potential nation-state adversaries with similar targeting - attribution uncertain
Incomplete Information Challenges:
- Government system logs missing critical periods due to retention policies
- Some ministry workstations lack adequate monitoring - compromise scope uncertain during conflict
- Counterintelligence investigation ongoing - strategic intelligence not yet available
- NATO security assessment delayed - must make critical decisions without full diplomatic impact analysis
Deep Coordination Requirements:
- Must justify all counterintelligence decisions with incomplete strategic communications exposure data
- Navigate conflicting stakeholder priorities without clear NATO guidance
- Coordinate with allied intelligence while evidence collection continues
- Balance international reporting requirements with ongoing forensic investigation needs
Advanced Challenge Scenario Variants
Variant A: Multi-Actor Attribution Challenge
- Evidence suggests both Russian and Chinese nation-state activity in government environment during conflict
- Must distinguish between Litter Drifter (Russian) and other APT operations (Chinese)
- Geopolitical response depends on accurate attribution - diplomatic implications significant
- Some USB devices may be counterintelligence from friendly nations testing security during tensions
Variant B: Allied Coordination Compromise Complexity
- USB devices traced to “trusted” NATO partner communications - potential coordination compromise
- Must assess whether compromise affects multiple Ukrainian ministries beyond Digital Infrastructure
- Allied partners considering alternative coordination - decision depends on Ministry investigation findings
- Government sector coordination required for nation-wide threat mitigation during conflict
Variant C: Insider Threat Dimension:
- Some government staff have suspicious foreign contacts - background investigation concerns during conflict
- Counterintelligence cannot rule out insider facilitation of nation-state access
- Diplomatic trust adjudication depends on incident response team’s assessment
- Must balance investigation of potential insider threats with government team morale
Variant D: Active Conflict Operations:
- Strategic communications already being used in ongoing diplomatic negotiations - operational security critical
- Compromise may affect active NATO coordination - urgent diplomatic assessment required
- Allied partners considering emergency coordination changes - strategic implications during conflict
- Diplomatic commanders demand immediate clarity on government compromise scope
Advanced NPC Complications
Minister Petrov (Competing Pressures):
- Receiving conflicting guidance from NATO coordination and Ukrainian government leadership
- Personal reputation at stake - career diplomatic project now under counterintelligence investigation
- Political career affected by incident resolution - legacy and credibility concerns
- May pressure team for conclusions that support diplomatic continuity over security thoroughness
Major Kozlov (National Security Stress):
- Under intense allied intelligence scrutiny - Ministry security posture under international review
- Responsible for government security that enabled months of undetected nation-state surveillance
- Career implications if Ministry loses NATO credibility or coordination role due to incident
- May become overly risk-averse and demand excessive security measures disrupting diplomatic operations
Maria Doroshenko (Under Investigation):
- Personal diplomatic role questioned pending counterintelligence investigation completion
- Defensive about government practices - fears career damage and credibility loss
- May withhold information about USB usage that could compromise colleagues
- Potential insider threat concern adds complexity to stakeholder coordination
Colonel Shevchenko (Conflicting Intelligence Missions):
- Counterintelligence investigation priorities may conflict with team’s incident response needs
- Cannot share all classified intelligence about geopolitical context and nation-state operations during conflict
- Pressure from multiple allied agencies with different investigation objectives and timelines
- May request team actions that serve intelligence collection but complicate incident resolution
Advanced Pressure Events
Minute 25: Forensic analysis reveals possible second nation-state actor - attribution becomes complex during conflict
Minute 50: Government staff representatives demand evidence of insider threat accusations before credibility questioning
Minute 75: Media leaked information about nation-state targeting - public pressure for rapid incident resolution
Minute 100: NATO partners request intelligence sharing about strategic compromise affecting joint operations during conflict
Minute 125: Intelligence service preliminary findings question Ministry coordination role eligibility
Minute 140: Counterintelligence investigation discovers strategic policy on dark web - wider exposure than expected during conflict
Advanced Facilitation Challenges
If Team Oversimplifies Attribution:
“Colonel Shevchenko shows you traffic analysis suggesting multiple nation-state actors with different objectives. How do you distinguish between Russian Litter Drifter operations and possible Chinese APT activity when diplomatic response depends on accurate attribution during conflict?”
If Team Ignores Insider Threat Indicators:
“Major Kozlov must report to allied intelligence about government staff with suspicious foreign contacts who had access to compromised systems. How do you investigate potential insider facilitation without destroying team morale or assuming guilt during conflict?”
If Team Rushes to Conclusions:
“Minister Petrov is pushing for quick resolution to salvage summit timeline, but forensic evidence remains incomplete with critical log gaps. How do you justify counterintelligence decisions when strategic compromise scope is uncertain during conflict?”
If Team Neglects Geopolitical Context:
“NATO coordination office is requesting intelligence about what diplomatic capabilities have been compromised, but counterintelligence hasn’t completed attribution. How does your incident response affect international partnerships and geopolitical strategy during conflict?”
Advanced Debrief Topics (30-35 min)
- Attribution Complexity in Nation-State Incidents:
- How do you distinguish between multiple APT actors with similar techniques during conflict?
- Why is attribution critical for diplomatic, strategic, and government response?
- What forensic evidence supports or contradicts attribution conclusions?
- When is “we’re not sure” an acceptable answer vs. avoiding responsibility?
- Insider Threat in Government Environments:
- How do you investigate potential insider involvement without assuming guilt during conflict?
- What counterintelligence indicators suggest deliberate facilitation vs. exploitation?
- How do diplomatic trust processes balance security concerns with due process?
- What organizational culture factors enable or prevent insider threats?
- Decision-Making Under Uncertainty:
- How do you make critical security decisions with incomplete forensic evidence during conflict?
- What level of confidence is required before NATO notification or international reporting?
- How do you communicate uncertainty to stakeholders demanding definitive answers?
- When should investigation continue vs. implementing response with imperfect information?
- Government Interdependencies:
- How do individual ministry incidents affect government-wide security posture during conflict?
- What information sharing obligations exist between ministries for threat intelligence?
- How do coordination compromises complicate attribution and remediation?
- What role does allied coordination play in orchestrating government response?
- Balancing Speed vs. Thoroughness:
- When is rapid incident resolution appropriate vs. comprehensive investigation during conflict?
- How do diplomatic pressures affect incident response quality and long-term security?
- What are the consequences of premature “all clear” declarations in APT incidents?
- How do you manage stakeholder expectations when thoroughness requires time?
- Real-World Nation-State Response Lessons:
- What actual government nation-state incidents inform this scenario?
- How have real incidents balanced diplomatic operational needs with security response?
- What government changes resulted from high-profile nation-state compromises?
- How do government environments create unique challenges compared to commercial incident response?